

The Only Way is Up



Exposition from Organisation View

December 6, 2019

Cvetko STANE, M.Sc.


The Only Way is Up



December 6, 2019

Cvetko STANE, M.Sc.

Mind Map



WWW.CAA.SI

► Search And Rescue MOBILE PHONE No.



Add to contacts

Block number

Saturday, 30 November 2019

1 06:00

Sesula se vam je spletna stran.

YOUR WEB SIDE WAS CRESHED



This site can't be reached

www.caa.si refused to connect.

Try:

- Checking the connection
- [Checking the proxy and the firewall](#)

ERR_CONNECTION_REFUSED


Reload

INFO


RESULT

MESSAGE FROM 11.MAY 2018

PROCESS vs PROCEDURE



PROCEDURE



MESSAGE FROM 11.MAY 2018

EASA Report



Agencija za civilno letalstvo RS, Konjškova 19a, 1000 Ljubljana

- ... Several chapters (e.g. chapter 1.4, 2.2, 2.16, 3.1, 3.4) are found **copy/paste** of the regulation without practical details how the organization complies with these requirements ...



EASA Report



Agencija za civilno letalstvo RS, Konjškova 19a, 1000 Ljubljana


- ... Several chapters were found **copy/paste** of the regulation without practical details how the organization complies with these requirements ...



FORGET



STEPS





Define the problem

copy/paste of practical details how with these




EASA Report

→ ... Several chapters
copy/paste practical details
complies with t





Collect Data





Identify possible cause factor



INTERNAL

- ▶ INTEREST PARTY
 - OPERATOR
 - CAMO AUDITORS



EXTERNAL



Identify the root cause

► AUDIT#1

145.A.48 Performance of maintenance

Regulation (EU) 2015/1536

- (b) an error capturing method is implemented after the performance of any critical maintenance task;



Identify the root cause

AMC2 145.A.48(b) Performance of maintenance

- (b) The procedure should describe which data sources are used to identify critical maintenance tasks. Several data sources may be used, such as:
- (1) information from the design approval holder;
 - (2) accident reports;
 - (3) investigation and follow-up of incidents;
 - (4) occurrence reporting;
 - (5) flight data analysis;
 - (6) results of audits;
 - (7) normal operations monitoring schemes; and
 - (8) feedback from training.



Identify the root cause

▶ AUDITOR REQUIRED ALL SOURCES


2.23. CRITICAL MAINTENANCE TASKS AND ERROR-CAPTURING METHODS

In order to identify critical maintenance tasks several data sources may be used – such as information from design approval holder, accident reports, investigation and follow-up of incidents, occurrence reporting, flight data analyses, audit results, operation monitoring schemes, feedback from training and AT past experiences from maintenance projects being performed.



Identify the root cause

- ▶ INTERPRETATION
- ▶ KNOWLEDGE/EXPERIENCE



CONFLICT OF INTEREST



Identify the root cause

applicable, should be attached to the EASA Form 1.

4.3 Used aircraft components removed from a serviceable aircraft (engine, component)

Serviceable aircraft components removed from a Member State registered aircraft (engine, component) may be issued with an EASA Form 1 by ■■■ subject to compliance with this subparagraph.

- a. ■■■ should ensure that the component was removed from the aircraft by an appropriately qualified person.
- b. The aircraft component may only be deemed serviceable if the last flight operation with the component fitted revealed no faults on that component/related system.
- c. The aircraft component should be inspected for satisfactory condition including in particular damage, corrosion or leakage and compliance with any additional maintenance data.
- d. The aircraft record should be researched for any unusual events that could affect the serviceability of the aircraft component such as involvement in accidents, incidents, heavy landings or lightning strikes. Under no circumstances may an EASA Form 1 be issued in accordance with this paragraph 4 if it is suspected that the aircraft component has been subjected to extremes of stress, temperatures or immersion which could affect its operation.
- e. A maintenance history record should be available for all used serialized aircraft components.
- f. Compliance with known modifications and repairs should be established.
- g. The flight hours/cycles/landings as applicable of any service life-limited parts including time since overhaul should be established.
- h. Compliance with known applicable airworthiness directives should be established.
- i. Subject to satisfactory compliance with this subparagraph 4.3, an EASA Form 1 may be issued and should contain the information as specified in paragraph 4.2 including the aircraft (engine, assembly) from which the aircraft component was removed.



Identify the root cause

applicable, should be attached to the EASA Form 1.

4.3 Used aircraft components removed from a serviceable aircraft (engine, component)

Serviceable aircraft components removed from a Member State registered aircraft (engine, component) may be issued with an EASA Form 1 by [redacted] subject to compliance with this subparagraph.

- a. [redacted] should ensure that the component was removed from the aircraft by an appropriately qualified person.
- b. The aircraft component may only be deemed serviceable if the last flight operation with the component fitted revealed no faults on the component/related system.
- c. The aircraft component should be inspected for satisfactory condition including in particular damage, corrosion or leakage and compliance with any additional maintenance data.
- d. The aircraft record should be researched for any unusual events that could affect the serviceability of the aircraft component such as involvement in accidents, incidents, heavy landings or lightning strikes. Under no circumstances may an EASA Form 1 be issued in accordance with this paragraph 4 if it is suspected that the aircraft component has been subjected to extremes of stress, temperatures or immersion which could affect its operation.
- e. A maintenance history record should be available for all used serialised aircraft components.
- f. Compliance with known modifications and repairs should be established.
- g. The flight hours/cycles/landings as applicable of any service life-limited parts including time since overhaul should be established.
- h. Compliance with known applicable airworthiness directives should be established.
- i. Subject to satisfactory compliance with this subparagraph 4.3, an EASA Form 1 may be issued and should contain the information as specified in paragraph 4.2 including the aircraft (engine, assembly) from which the aircraft component was removed.

- (b) The aircraft component may only be deemed serviceable if the last flight operation with the component fitted revealed no faults on that component/related system.
- (c) The aircraft component should be inspected for satisfactory condition including in particular damage, corrosion or leakage and compliance with any additional maintenance data.
- (d) The aircraft record should be researched for any unusual events that could affect the serviceability of the aircraft component such as involvement in accidents, incidents, heavy landings or lightning strikes. Under no circumstances may an EASA Form 1 be issued in accordance with this paragraph 2.6 if it is suspected that the aircraft component has been subjected to extremes of stress, temperatures or immersion which could affect its operation.
- (e) A maintenance history record should be available for all used serialised aircraft components.
- (f) Compliance with known modifications and repairs should be established.
- (g) The flight hours/cycles/landings as applicable of any service life-limited parts including time since overhaul should be established.
- (h) Compliance with known applicable airworthiness directives should be established.

Procedure from MRO

AMC2 145.A.50(d)



Identify the root cause

► COPY – PASTE

Auditor



Auditees

CONFLICT OF INTEREST



Identify the root cause

► AUDIT #2

Description	Level
Safety rings on breakers but no associated tag as required by the AMM.	Minor





Identify the root cause

Description	Level
Safety rings on breakers but no associated tag as required by the AMM.	Minor

Solution proposal

According to AMM Rev. May 1st 2019 tags on safety ring are not required. The preposition was beneficial, and we will think about it but for now, we are following the procedures.


AIRBUS

Customer : ENV	Manual : ESPM
Type : TA-A318/A319/A320/A321	Selected applicability :
Rev. Date : May 01, 2019	
ABS0772FAPE3,NSA931305F6198,NSA5515F6198or equivalent	

AE. ABS0772 (FAPE3),NSA931305 (F6198),NSA5515 (F6198)or equivalent

(Ref. Fig. Circuit Breakers - Safety Clips Allocation Table ABS0772, NSA931305, NSA5515-X or Equivalent SHEET 1)

CIRCUIT BREAKERS	SAFETY CLIPS
E0313	NSA931305-01 WITH TIE WRAP NSA935401 * OR ABS0772A02 **
E0459	NSA931305-01 WITH TIE WRAP NSA935401 * OR ABS0772A01 **
E0730-005	NSA931305-01 OR ABS0772A02 **
E0731-005	NSA931305-01 OR ABS0772A02 **
E0732-005	NSA931305-01 WITH TIE WRAP NSA935401 * OR ABS0772A01 **



ABS0772 PLASTIC CLIP

CONFLICT OF INTEREST



Identify the root cause

- ▶ INTERPRETATION
- ▶ KNOWLEDGE/EXPERIENCE
- ▶ COPY-PASTE SAFT LAW






Identify the root cause





Recommended solutions



STANDARDIZATION



Recommended solutions



STANDARDIZATION

